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Abstract—We in this paper introduce an advanced eaves-
dropper that aims to paralyze the artificial-noise-aided se-
cure communications. We consider the M -1-2 Gaussian MISO
wiretap channel, which consists of a M -antenna transmitter,
a single-antenna receiver, and a two-antenna eavesdropper.
This type of eavesdropper, by adopting an optimal Grassmann
manifold (OGM) filtering structure, can reduce the maximum
achievable secrecy rate (MASR) to be zero by using only two
receive antennas, regardless of the number of antennas at
the transmitter. Specifically, the eavesdropper exploits linear
filters to serially recover the legitimate information symbols
and intends to find the optimal filter that minimizes the mean-
square error (MSE) in estimating the symbols. During the
process, a convex semidefinite programming (SDP) problem
with constraints on the filter matrix can be formulated and
solved. Interestingly, the resulted optimal filters constitute a
complex Grassmann manifold on the matrix space. Based on
the filters, a novel expression of MASR is derived and further
verified to be zero under the noiseless environment. Besides this,
an achievable variable region (AVR) that induces zero MASR is
presented analytically in the noisy case. Numerical results are
provided to illustrate the huge disaster in the respect of secrecy
rate.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, eavesdropping, artifi-
cial noise, MISO, Grassmann manifold.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research on physical layer security has been drawing
great attentions with various wireless technologies moving
forward. This protection technique, by exploiting the wireless
channel variations, can enhance the information secrecy of
network which is conventionally protected by the cryptogra-
phy in the upper layers of network protocol stack. The initial
research on the physical layer security refers to the area of
information-theoretic secrecy in the wiretap channel which
consists of a source, a destination, and an eavesdropper that
attempts to intercept the communication between the source
and the destination [1]. The authors in [2] investigated a
fundamental secrecy measure called secrecy capacity which
is defined as the maximum achievable secrecy rate (MASR)
between the source and the destination while ensuring that
no information can be inferred by the eavesdropper. It was
shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can be achieved
between the source and the destination if the channel to the
destination is better than that to the eavesdropper. Otherwise,
the temporal variations of the channel and the additional
degrees of multi-antennas have to be exploited to maintain a
positive secrecy rate [3], [4]. The key point is that the perfect
knowledge of channel state information (CSI) of the main
and eavesdropper channel is required at the source, which
however is an unpractical assumption [5].
Therefore, large amounts of research have been concen-
trated on the secure transmission under imperfect acquisition
of eavesdropper’s CSI at the source. Among those work,
artificial noise (AN), being emitted on top of the information-
bearing signal to disrupt the reception at the eavesdropper,
gradually comes to be the commonsense of guaranteeing high
secrecy rate [6]. With the aid of multi-antenna channels, AN
can be placed in the dimensions that cause least interference
at the destination but engender dramatic difference between
the signal qualities at the destination and the eavesdropper.
There exist huge number of AN-based transmission strate-
gies, such as the precoder design and power allocation mech-
anisms [7]–[10]. In a multiple-input-single-output-multiple-
antenna eavesdropper (MISOME) system where eavesdrop-
pers are equipped with less antennas than the source, au-
thors in [7] gave an analytical closed-form expression of an
achievable secrecy rate and determined an optimal transmit
power allocation between the legitimate signal and the AN
to maximize the secrecy rate. Authors in [8] studied the
AN based scheme in MIMO wiretap channel scenario and
presented that the achievable secrecy rate can however be ar-
bitrarily far from the secrecy capacity if the eavesdropper has
more antennas than the source and destination. Authors in [9]
investigated the optimal physical-layer secure transmission
with artificial noise in the wiretap channel and analyzed the
impact of the number of transceiver antennas on the secrecy
rate. Authors in [10] considered secure downlink transmis-
sion in an AN-aided multicell massive MIMO system with a
passive multi-antenna eavesdropper. It shows that even with
AN assistance, secure transmission can not be guaranteed if
the number of eavesdropper antennas is too large. The above
AN based schemes assumed that the eavesdropper usually
adopt a theoretically capacity-achievable receiver to combat
AN. Note that this type of receiver is originally designed
without considering the artificial interference. However, there
are few literatures discussing the effect of receiver design on
the AN based schemes, especially from an eavesdropping
perspective. The resulted eavesdropper is therefore underes-
timated and mistaken to have to eliminate AN interference
completely by consuming large antenna resources.
To give a more comprehensive understanding of the func-
tionality of AN mechanism, we in this paper first introduce
an optimal Grassmann manifold (OGM) receiver at the eaves-
dropper which can exploit the statistical property of received
data to combat AN. We can show that secrecy protection
usually achieved by AN can be completely broken down by
the eavesdropper with only two receive antennas, no matter
how many antennas have been equipped at the source. Our
contributions are detailed as follows:
1) Based on the covariance of received data, a whitening
operation is performed on the received data to elimi-
nate the power influence of AN. Thereafter, a vector-
based projector is derived so that the eavesdropper can
identify the phase information of secrecy information
symbols from the whitened data. Finally, an explicit
expression of recovered data is presented but subjected
to an unknown filtering matrix.
2) Based on the calculation of the mean-squared error
(MSE) of estimated symbols, an optimization problem
of minimizing the MSE can be formulated in which the
filter matrix serves as the optimized variable. Particu-
larly, this problem can be cast as a convex semidefinite
program (SDP) and solved with a closed-form optimal
solution. Interestingly, the solution includes a series of
filters which are verified to lie on a complex Grassmann
manifold.
3) Based on the optimal filter structure, the novel ex-
pression of MASR is derived. In the noiseless case,
the optimal power strategy of achieving MASR is
transformed into no power allocation for AN and zero
secrecy rate can be always induced. This security
disaster is further confirmed through simulations in a
wide range of node locations and under a large number
of transmit antennas. In the noisy case, an expression
of achievable variable region (AVR) is derived and
essentially constituted by several factors, such as, a
controllable unitary matrix, the eavesdropper’s noise
level and its distance to the source. To be worse, the
eavesdropper can control AVR and then cause zero
secrecy rate no matter how many antennas are utilized
at the source. We also simulate the AVR and confirm
its existence even when the legitimate destination is
located in various regions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the system model overview. A novel eaves-
dropping threat and its technical modeling is given in Sec-
tion III. An optimal grassmann eavesdropping manifold is
constructed in Section IV. Secrecy performance analysis is
performed in Section V. Simulation results are presented in
Section VI. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VII.
Notation: Boldface is used for vector a and matrix A.
AH respectively denotes the conjugate transpose of matrix
A. A (:, n) represents the n-th column of A. ‖·‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm of a vector or a matrix. E {·} is the
expectation operator. Re {·} and |·| respectively represent the
real part and the modulus of a complex number.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a M -1-2 wiretap channel where a transmitter
Alice with M antennas communicates with a single-antenna
legitimate receiver Bob and is also eavesdropped by an
eavesdropper Eve with two antennas satisfying 2 < M .
We denote the i-th transmitted symbol at Alice as si ∈
CM×1, i = 1, . . . , T . T represents the total number of
symbols (or channel uses) within each coherence interval.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the security threat in artificial-noise-aided M -1-2
wiretap channels: An eavesdropper intends to exploit advanced receiver
filters to enhance the interception of information belonging to Bob.
The symbols received at Bob and Eve for i = 1, . . . , T are
respectively given by:
yB,i = hBsi + nB,i
yE,i = HEsi + nE,i
(1)
where hB ∈ C1×M denotes the channel from Alice to Bob.
HE ∈ C2×M denotes the channel from Alice to Eve. The
elements of hB and HE are assumed to be independent zero-
mean complex Gaussian random variables with unit variance.
The components of nB,i and nE,i are the equivalent noise
with power σ2B and σ
2
E, respectively. We assume nB,i =
β
−1/2
B n˜B,i and nE,i = β
−1/2
E n˜E,i where βB and βE are path
loss factors respectively from Alice to Bob and Eve. n˜B,i
and n˜E,i are i.i.d. additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
samples with variance σ˜2B and σ˜
2
E, respectively. That’s to say,
there exists σ2B=β
−1
E σ˜
2
B and σ
2
E = β
−1
E σ˜
2
E. Also we have the
following assumption:
1) Channels obey the block-fading model where the chan-
nel state remains quasi-static over each coherence inter-
val (or channel block), but becomes independent across
a different fading block.
2) T within each coherence interval is large enough to
allow for invoking random coding arguments [3].
3) hB is accurately estimated by Bob and is also known by
Alice using a noiseless feedback link from Bob and the
knowledge of both hB and HE is available at Eve [6].
As shown in Fig. 1, the key idea of AN proposed in [6] is that
Alice combines the information-bearing symbols intended for
Bob with the AN symbols which are generated into the null
space of Bob’s channel. Thanks to AN, the signal reception of
Eve can be disturbed while Bob is not affected. Thus positive
secrecy capacity can be achieved and huge secrecy rate gains
can be maintained. In this case, the transmitted signal vector
si at Alice is represented by si = vi+ni, i = 1, . . . , T where
vi ∈ CM×1 is the transmitted signal vector intended for Bob
and ni ∈ CM×1 is the AN vector. In particular, vi satisfies
vi = wxi where w ∈ CM×1 is the beamforming vector and
xi is the the information bearing symbol. AN, independent of
vi, satisfies ni =W⊥ai whereW⊥ ∈ CM×(M−1) lies in the
null space ofHB. It is assumed that xi and elements of ai are
complex Gaussian distributed and independently transmitted
in time domain, with variance σ2x and σ
2
a respectively. Then
the symbols received at Bob and Eve respectively become
yB,i = hBwxi + nB,i, i = 1, . . . , T
yE,i = HEwxi +HEW⊥ai + nE,i, i = 1, . . . , T
(2)
We consider that the total power per transmission denoted
by P satisfies P = σ2x + (M − 1) σ2a. We also denote the
fraction of total power allocated to the information bearing
signal as α and have:
σ2x = αP
σ2a = (1− α)P/(M − 1), α ∈ [0, 1] (3)
III. NOVEL EAVESDROPPING THREAT AND ITS
TECHNICAL MODELING
Based on above AN based context, we in this section
introduce a novel statistical eavesdropping threat and give the
specific modeling details for this threat, following the analy-
sis of secrecy capacity under traditional receiver assumption
for Eve.
A. What We Originally Thought: Eavesdropper Suffers from
AN Interference
To begin with, let us focus on the traditional definition
of secrecy capacity which is based on the maximization
of mutual information difference. Note that the capacity-
achievable combiner (CAC) at Eve is not well specified.
When AN is introduced for Eve, the same methodology for
secrecy capacity is followed since Eve does not know the
specific value of AN and can deem AN as a colored noise
equivalently. In this context, the secrecy capacity and its
lower bound can be respectively represented by [6]:
CS = max
σ2
x
,σ2
a
[CB − CE]+
CS,lower = max
σ2
x
,σ2
a
[CB − CE,upper]+ (4)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}, and
CB = log2
(
1 +
σ2x
σ2B
‖hB‖2
)
, (5)
CE = log2
(
1 + σ2xw
HHHEK
−1
E,1HEw
)
, (6)
and
CE,upper = log2
(
1 +
M − 1
α−1 − 1w
HHHEK
−1
E,2HEw
)
(7)
wherew is the beamformer matrix satisfyingw = hB/‖hB‖.
KE,1 = σ
2
aHEW⊥W
H
⊥H
H
E + I2 is derived under the noisy
Eve case while KE,2=HEW⊥W
H
⊥H
H
E is formulated in the
case of a noiseless eavesdropping environment which creates
an lower bound on the secrecy capacity [7].
However, the continual utilization of CAC is not feasible
for Eve because it can exploit the statistical property of
received data, not even necessarily distinguish between sig-
nals, and enhance the decoding efficiency of the information
symbols that was intercepted.
B. What Eve Can Actually Do: Introducing Statistical Filter
to Combat AN Interference
In this section, we introduce the concept of OGM eaves-
dropping and show how Eve can exploit the statistical infor-
mation of received signals to devise the advanced filter. Let
us consider the received symbols of length N (N ≤ T ) in
one channel block for Eve:
YE = HEwx+HEW⊥A+NE (8)
where YE = [yE,i∈N ] ∈ C2×N , x = [xi∈N ] ∈ C1×N ,
A = [ai∈N ] ∈ C(M−1)×N ,NE = [nE,i∈N ] ∈ C2×N .N rep-
resents the time sample set defined as N ∆= {t |1 ≤ t ≤ N }.
We consider a transformation satisfying:
YE=UYE (9)
where U ∈ C2×2 is the unitary matrix and can be known and
arbitrarily configured by Eve. We define U as the transform
matrix. Then we can rewrite the signal model under α ∈
(0, 1) as follows:
YE = HS+NE (10)
where H
∆
=
[
σxUHEw σaUHEW⊥
]
, S
∆
=
[
x
A
]
and
NE = UNE. Each of elements in x and A are respectively
power-normalized version of that in x and A. Based on this
model, we give the following steps regarding the novel OGM
filter design:
1) Whitening Data: We define the estimation of covari-
ance matrix of YE as R̂YE
∆
= YEY
H
E
/
N and derive the
noiseless version as follows:
R̂S = R̂YE − σ2EI2 (11)
The whitening operation, defined as Q ∈ C2×2, is performed
on YE to eliminate the second-order statistical information,
which is given as follows:
I2=QR̂SQ
H (12)
After performing singular value decomposition (SVD) on
R̂S, we have R̂S = UΣU
H. Based on equation (12), we
have:
Q = XΣ−1/2UH,XXH = I2 (13)
where X ∈ C2×2 is an unknown matrix for further optimiza-
tion. Then the signal after whitening is given as:
Y∆
∆
= QY=XVS+QNE (14)
where V satisfies V = Σ−1/2
[
Σ1/2 0
]
VH. VH
is the right eigenmatrix satisfying the matrix SVD with
H=U
[
Σ1/2 0
]
VH. As we can see, any replacement
for the matrix X with other matrices satisfying equation (14)
leaves the covariance of Y∆ unchanged, which means that
the power influence of AN is removed. The same happens
when any replacement for unitary matrices V with other
unitary matrix. However, XV
H
causes a phase error on the
symbol estimation of S at Eve.
2) Projecting the Processed Data onto a Basis: To elimi-
nate the phase error, Eve is designed to project the whitened
data ontoXV
H
(:, 1) and to estimate the information bearing
symbols intended for Bob. We denote the projector as
q = XV
H
(:, 1) = QH (:, 1) (15)
It is obviously that there exists ‖q‖2 ≤ 1. Based on the
overall two steps, we can have the following proposition for
the symbol-level filtering.
Proposition 1. Given the first column of matrix H, the
estimated version of the symbol vector x under the OGM
filter with the region α ∈ (0, 1) can be derived as follows:
x̂ = qHQYE (16)
The overall serial filtering process at Eve can be shown in
Fig. 2.
NMSE = H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2Z
(
I2+σ
2
EΣ
−1
)
ZHΣ−1/2UHH (:, 1)− 2H(:, 1)HUΣ−1/2ZHΣ−1/2UHH (:, 1)+1 (19)
L (Z, λ, µ,Ψ) = Tr
{
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)HUΣ−1/2Z
(
I2+σ
2
EΣ
−1
)
ZH − 2Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)HUΣ−1/2ZH
}
− λ
{
Tr
{
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2ZH
}
−1
}
− µ{Tr {ZH}− 2}− Tr{ΨZH} (21)
λ∗=
1−H(:, 1)HUΣ−1/2Γ
(
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2
) [
I2 + σ
2
EΣ
−1
]−1
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)
H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2[I2 + σ2EΣ
−1]
−1
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)
− 2 (23)
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF OPTIMAL GRASSMANN
EAVESDROPPING MANIFOLD
In this section, we formulate an optimization problem of
minimizing MSE on the variable matrix X and derive an
optimal Grassmann manifold by solving this problem. Not
that we only consider the case where the power ratio satisfies
0 < α < 1 in the following. If AN does not exist (α = 1),
the conventional CAC receiver can be utilized at Eve. The
detection of whether AN happens can be based on the rank
detection of the covariance matrix R̂S. We do not specify the
details of detection but focus on the following filter design.
A. Optimization Formulation
Consider the MSE in estimating symbols x̂ and give the
symbol estimation error as follows:
∆x
∆
= x̂− x=qHQYE − S (1, :) (17)
with the NMSE defined as:
NMSE
∆
= E
{
‖∆x‖2
/
N
}
(18)
After simplification, the NMSE can be derived as equation
(19) if we define Z=XHX. The optimization problem of
minimizing NMSE is built up as follows:
min
Z
Tr
{
TZ
(
I2+σ
2
EΣ
−1
)
ZH − 2TZH}
s. t. T = Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2
H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2ZHΣ−1/2UHH (:, 1)− 1 ≤ 0,
Tr {Z}=2,
Z  0.
(20)
In this optimization, the second constraint is constructed
according to the principle of ‖q‖2 ≤ 1. The third and fourth
constraint mean that matrix Z should satisfy the same rank
requirements as XXH.
B. Optimal Solution
We can easily prove that the above optimization is a
convex problem. Besides, the set of constraint functions is
convex and the Slater condition is satisfied. Therefore, the
KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary for the optimum
solution. Then we build up the Lagrangian as the equation
(21) and the KKT conditions for the optimization problem
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed OGM filter at Eve.
are given by:
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2Z
(
I2 + σ
2
EΣ
−1
)
− (λ+ 2)Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)HUΣ−1/2
−µI2 −Ψ = 0 (22 a)
λ
{
H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2ZHΣ−1/2UHH (:, 1)− 1
}
= 0 (22 b)
H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2ZHΣ−1/2UHH (:, 1)− 1 ≤ 0 (22 c)
Tr
{
ZH
}− 2 = 0 (22 d)
Tr
{
ΨZH
}
= 0 (22 e)
Z  0 (22 f)
Ψ  0, λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 (22 g)
According to the equation (22 d) and (22 e), the solution
Ψ∗ should be equal to be zero matrix. Considering the rank
constraints on both sides of the equation (22 a), we can obtain
the solution µ∗=0. Then we can get the closed form of λ∗
in equation (23) and then derive the solution Z∗ as follows:
Z∗= {Γ+(λ∗ + 2)⊗ I} [I2 + σ2EΣ−1]−1 (24)
where Γ is the null space of matrix
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2. Based on the equation
(13) and (24), a Grassmann manifold G (2, 2) can be thus
constructed as the following:
G (2, 2) = {X ∈ C2×2 : XXH = I2,XHX = Z∗} (25)
As a special case where the null space is a zero matrix, we
can derive a simplified version of Z∗ as follows:
Z
∗
=
[
I2 + σ
2
EΣ
−1
]−1
H(:, 1)
H
UΣ−1/2[I2 + σ2EΣ
−1]
−1
Σ−1/2UHH (:, 1)
(26)
V. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we firstly derive the exact expression of
SINR in a closed form for Eve under the OGM filter. Then
we analyse the MASR under different noise level of Eve and
Ψ1 = σ
2
xσ
2
aA+ σ
2
xσ
2
EB,Ψ2 = σ
2
xσ
4
aC,Ψ3 = 2σ
2
xσ
4
EB + 2σ
2
xσ
2
aσ
2
ED,
A = |h1|2‖h4‖2 + |h2|2‖h3‖2 − 2Re
{
hH1 h2h
H
4 h3
}
, B = |h1|2 + |h2|2 − 2Re
{
hH1 h2
}
,
C = ‖h4‖4|h1|2 + ‖h3‖4|h2|2 +
(
|h1|2 + |h2|2
)
‖h3‖2‖h4‖2 − 2
(
‖h3‖2 + ‖h4‖2
)
Re
{
hH1 h2h
H
4 h3
}
,
D = |h1|2‖h4‖2 + |h2|2‖h3‖2 − 2Re{hH1 h2hH4 h3}+
(
|h1|2 + |h2|2
)
Re
{
hH4 h3
}− (‖h3‖2 + ‖h4‖2)Re{hH1 h2} .
(30)
show how Eve can achieve the eavesdropping disaster: zero
MASR.
A. Closed Form of SINR Expression
Theoretically, we assume the data length is enough large
and the covariance matrix R̂S can be precisely approximated
as HHH. By using the OGM filter, the SINR of Eve can be
derived as the following:
SINRE =
[
H(:, 1)H
(
HHH + σ2EI2
)−1
H (:, 1)
]2
σ2EH(:, 1)
H
(HHH + σ2EI2)
−2
H (:, 1)
(27)
For simplicity, we define the following equation:
h1
∆
= U (1, :)HEw, h2
∆
= U (2, :)HEw
h3
∆
= U (1, :)HEW⊥,h4
∆
= U (2, :)HEW⊥
(28)
Then the exact expression of SINR at Eve can be expressed
as:
SINRE =
Ψ21
σ2E (Ψ2 +Ψ3)
(29)
where Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3 can be shown in equation (30). Based
on this equation, we propose the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For the M -1-2 Gaussian wiretap channel, the
MASR is given by:
max
σ2
x
,σ2
a
,σ2
B
min
σ2
E
,U
CS (31)
where
CS =
{
C−S 0 < σ
2
x < P
C+S σ
2
x = 0 or σ
2
x = P
(32)
with
C−S =

log2

1 + σ
2
x
σ2
B
‖hB‖2
1 + SINRE




+
(33)
and
C+S =

log2

 1 + σ
2
x
σ2
B
‖hB‖2
1 +
σ2
x
σ2
E
‖HEhB/‖hB‖‖2




+
(34)
When AN exists or equivalently 0 < α < 1, OGM filter
can be generated as shown in the above section. In this case,
the achievable secrecy rate can be easily expressed as C−S .
Otherwise, Eve adopts the conventional CAC receiver and
the achievable secrecy rate can be expressed as C+S . Note
that the minimization operation is considered since σ2E, U
can be optimized by Eve to reduce the secrecy rate. In what
follows, we will discuss the effect of equivalent noise levels
at Eve on the MASR performance.
B. Noiseless Case
In this case, the equivalent noise level is arbitrary small.
An intuitive interpretation is that Bob or Eve is much closer
to Alice [6] and/ or have very low noise level. In this context,
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. With σ2E → 0, the MASR is equal to zero.
Proof. let us consider the case where 0 < σ2x < P . The SINR
of Eve will satisfy :
SINREσ
2
E
σ2x
→ A
2
C
(35)
The secrecy rate is given by:
C−S =

log2

1 + σ
2
x
σ2
B
‖hB‖2
1 +
σ2
x
σ2
E
A2
C




+
0<σ2
x
<P
, (36)
Note that C−S increases monotonically with σ
2
x when
‖hB‖
2
σ2
B
> A
2
σ2
E
C
, and decreases monotonically, otherwise.
Therefore, the MASR is achieved at σ2x = P . At this
point, the achievable secrecy rate is transformed into C+S .
Obviously, C+S is equal to be zero when σ
2
E → 0. The proof
is completed.
C. Noisy Case
In this situation, the equivalent noise can not be ignored at
both Bob and Eve whose noise level and distance to Alice can
be arbitrarily managed. Besides, it is noted that the variables,
such as h1,h2,H3, and H4, in C
−
S , depend on Eve’s CSI,
Alice’s beamformer and U. As a feasible assumption, Eve is
enabled to obtain those available information. Especially, σ2E
and U are both controllable by Eve. Therefore, the resulted
SINR of Eve can be modified and redesigned by itself. Then,
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Given perfect CSI and Alice’s beamformer
at noisy Eve, there always exist variables σ2E, U such that
C−S can be restricted to be zero; Particularly, C
−
S at high
SINR is equal to zero ∀P ∈ (0,∞) if the following sufficient
condition is satisfied:
σ2E
(
B2
A2
− 2B
C
)
≤ 2
(
B
A
− D
C
)
,
B
A
<
D
C
, (37)
σ2E
σ2B
<
∥∥HEhHB/‖hB‖∥∥2
‖hB‖2
(38)
whichs make log function to be monotonically increasing with
σ2x, or
σ2E
(
B2
A2
− 2B
C
)
≥ 2
(
B
A
− D
C
)
,
B
A
>
D
C
(39)
which makes log function to be monotonically decreasing
with σ2x, or
A2
σ2EC
≥ ‖hB‖
2
σ2B
,
D
C
=
B
A
(40)
which makes log function to be irrelevant with the trans-
mission power. The values of A, B, C, D can be shown in
equation (30).
HE =
[
0.60− 0.80i 0.06 + 0.61i 1.05− 0.28i −0.49 + 0.16i
−0.36 + 0.47i −0.42 + 0.29i 0.09 + 1.53i 0.10− 0.59i
]
(43)
HL =
[ −0.71 + 0.12i 0.41 + 0.94i 0.20 + 0.91i −1.44 + 1.49i ] ,U∗ = [ −√0.2257 −√0.7743−√0.7743 √0.2257
]
(44)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND VALUES
Simulation Parameters Values
Path-loss model Eq. (26)
Small-scale fading model CN (0, IM )
Length N of data 200 (symbols)
Noiseless case: dB, dE
[
0, 104
]
(m)
Noisy case: available region of x, y, z (−∞, 0], [0,∞), [0, 4]
Maximum transmit power P 35 (dBm)
Noisy case: noise power σ˜2
B
(10MHZ bandwidth) −102 (dBm)
Proof. Let us focus on the monotonicity of the inner log
function in C−S . According to its high-order derivative, we
can prove that there exists available variables σ2E, U such
that the log function is monotone. However, it is exhausting
to obtain a sufficient and necessary condition in the form
of an explicit expression of those variables. Particularly in
high SINR and 0 < α < 1, we transform the original C−S
into C−S =
[
log2
(
σ2
E
σ2
B
‖hB‖2 σ
4
a
C−2σ2
a
σ2
E
D+2σ4
E
B
σ4
a
A2−2σ2
E
ABσ2
a
+σ4
E
B2
)]+
. Now
we introduce the sufficient condition to achieve zero secrecy
rate.
When the log function is controlled by Eve to be mono-
tonically increasing with α, the condition (37), (38) has to
be satisfied. In this situation, the achievable secrecy rate
is gradually increased with the increase of transmission
power allocated for information bearing signals and the
maximum will be achieved at α = 1. Thus the condition
σ2
E
σ2
B
<
‖HEhB/‖hB‖‖
2
‖hB‖
2 should be further satisfied to make
C+S |α=1 zero.
Otherwise, in order to make the log function monotonically
decrease, we determine that the condition (39) should be
satisfied so that the maximum is achieved at α = 0.
Obviously, α = 0 means that there is no transmission process
and naturally indicates that the available secrecy rate is equal
to zero.
Finally, if log function in 0 < α < 1 is a constant with
the variable α, we determine the condition (40) to make C−S
zero. The proof is completed.
Moreover, we define the available variable pair as
(
σ2E,U
)
and collect those pairs that satisfy the above proposition
to construct an achievable variable region (AVR) for Eve.
Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In noisy case, there always exists an AVR such
that MASR is equal to zero.
It is a natural result from the Proposition 2 since the C−S
can be reduced to be zero when 0 < α < 1 and otherwise the
C+S can be controlled to be zero by Eve through a suitable
configuration of σ2E.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of
M -1-2 wiretap channel model in the context of AN-based
transmission mode at Alice. We consider the average MASR
α
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Fig. 3. Average secrecy rate versus the power ratio of α under two types
of receivers in the noisy environment.
performance under ergodic scenario and also determine a op-
eration region achieving zero secrecy rate under one channel
block. Generally, the path loss expressed in decibels satisfies
the following:
PL (d) = PL (d0) + 10nlog10
(
d
d0
)
(41)
where d0 is the reference point at 1 km and n is known as
the path loss exponent. In this paper, we consider a practical
3GPP urban model where PL (d0) = 148.1 and n = 3.76.
βB and βE can be derived from dB and dE based on equation
(41). To better characterize the operation region of noisy Eve,
we define several metrics as follows:
x
∆
= log10
(
σ˜2E
/
σ˜2B
)
, y
∆
= log10 (βE/βB) , z
∆
= log10 (dB)
(42)
When Bob is located in different regions z, x and y represent
the measures that noisy Eve could take to reduce the secrecy
rate to be zero. The detailed simulation parameters can be
shown in Table I.
Fig. 3 shows the average secrecy rate versus the power
ratio of α under different receivers at Eve. In this example,
the number of transmit antennas satisfies M = 10 and the
equivalent noise level of Bob is assumed to be equal to that
of Eve, that’s to say, σ2B = σ
2
E. We also fix the SNR P
/
σ2B
at 30 in dB. As we can see, the average secrecy rate under
OGM filter increases with α and achieves the maximum at
α = 1 whereas the MASR under traditional CAC receiver
is achieved around at α = 0.5. Basically, the MASR under
OGM receiver is equal to that without using AN at Alice,
which means that the AN scheme is completely broken down
by Eve. This phenomenon in high SNR is in accord with the
result shown in the equation (36). The MASR loss can be as
far as 8 bit/s/Hz.
In Fig. 4, we present the operation region (x, y, z) which
is available for noisy Eve to cause zero secrecy rate. Alice
adopts the maximum transmission power shown in Table I.
For clarity, we consider one-time channel realization and
Fig. 4. Operation region (x, y, z) of noisy Eve under the channel model
in equation (43) and (44) with the transform matrix U
∗
. Our strategy is to
achieve the condition (37) and (38).
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focus on arbitrary channel matrices. As an example, the sim-
ulated channel matrices and the generated transform matrix
are shown in equation (43) and (44). Note that the transform
matrix is always available and can be optimized based on the
channel matrices and precoders at Eve. As we can see, the
operation region is extensive. Especially, OGM based Eve
can achieve zero secrecy rate when z ∈ [0, 4] or equivalently
dB ∈
[
1, 104
]
, by flexibly controlling its path loss and
reducing the noise level so that there exist y ∈ [0.5, 5.3]
and x ∈ [−13, 0].
Fig. 5 demonstrates the average MASR performance versus
the distance measure dB and dE. Alice adopts the maximum
transmission power shown in Table I. The power allocation
ratio in traditional AN based scheme is configured to be
0.5 [7] and the number of antennas is set to be M = 10.
In this case we assume that Bob has same noise level of Eve
and the noise level can approach zero. We can see that the
secrecy rate, even under the scenario where Bob tries its best
to reduce noise, has to be zero and becomes irrelevant to the
distances when the OGM-based Eve occurs. Therefore, the
traditional expression of secrecy rate under AN-based scheme
comes to be imprecise and the CAC receiver assumption for
Eve actually causes a huge security for the system.
Fig. 6 shows the average MASR performance under var-
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Fig. 6. Average MASR versus the distance dB and M in the noiseless
case: σ2
B
= σ2
E
→ 0.
ious dB and M in the noiseless Eve. Alice adopts the
maximum transmission power shown in Table I. In terms of
traditional AN based simulations, the location of Eve is fixed
at dE = 1000 and the power ratio is fixed at α = 0.55 which
is verified to be optimal in [7]. As we can see, the MASR
under traditional AN based scheme is gradually enhanced
with the increase of dB and M . However, the MASR under
OGM-based Eve is always equal to be zero. This result is
irrelevant to the variation of dB and the increase of M . This
is because the high-SINR level induced by the OGM filter can
suppress the high array gains which are brought by Alice for
Bob and usually guaranteed by very large number of transmit
antennas.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel eavesdropping behav-
ior which is targeted for AN based secure transmission. We
demonstrated how Eve utilized a series of optimal filters to
combat the influence of AN and proved that the maximum
achievable secrecy rate which is subjected to this advanced
eavesdropper was compelled to be zero in the case of both
noiseless and noisy case. Simulation results showed that both
the distance measure, either from Alice to Bob or to Eve,
actually could not eliminate or reduce this disaster impact.
This terrible phenomenon also occurred even though the
number of transmit antennas is increased significantly.
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